Said El Mansour Cherkaoui – Admin – Group expert  · February 19, 2016 –   · 

Portrait and Work of Doukkalais: Abdallah Laroui

Title: Western Orientalism and Liberal Islam: Mutual Distrust?

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Fulbright 50th Anniversary Distinguished Fellow (Lecture delivered at the Middle East Studies Association annual meeting in Providence, Rhodes Island, USA)

I BEGIN this talk by telling you a story, that of a Spaniard who was living in the Moroccan city of Tangiers. One day he came to see the president of the local Council of Ulemas and said to him: “I feel attracted to your religion. I would have embraced it already but for one thing which disturbs me.”

“What is it?” asked the ’Alim.

“I am a musician by profession,” answered the Spaniard, “and Islam forbids music.”

“Who told you that?” retorted the ’Alim angrily. The would-be convert didn’t reply, which he would have done nowadays, as I hear it in the news; he simply pulled out of his pocket a sheet of paper and gave it to the man of religion who read it and understood everything. It was an ad for a book recently published by a local professor.

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The West Inside the Middle East

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Middle East Changes & National Interest of the West This analysis intends to enhance the important mechanism, to draw the background and to identify The actors and the determining factors that have interacted to create the historical script, the roles and the direction of the current conflictual and antagonistic plays we are actually watching as … Lire la Suite →

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The ’Alim began to explain patiently that the book was five centuries old and that it was about a theological controversy known as the Sama’ Dispute over the way the Koran should be read in public. What was forbidden, at least in the eyes of some clerics, was to sing the words of the Holy message because the listener would be more interested in the music than in the meaning. But it was soon clear for the ’Alim that he was speaking for nothing. His visitor had read in the article exactly what he was hoping to find, an Islam more rigorous, stern, severe than his own religion. Otherwise his conversion would be pointless. The kind of Islam the ’Alim was offering him, simple, moderate, conciliatory, Jesuitical in a word, wasn’t the real thing.

I am telling you this story because, with the recent development of the movement known as Islamic fundamentalism and the growing number of publications that aim to explain its meaning to anxious audiences in the West, I often cast myself in the role of that poor ’Alim confronting the Spaniard of Tangiers.

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Middle East – Mosaic of Foreign Interests Shaped by Local Collaboration

AUGUST 10, 2018

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

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Western Orientalism

Le miroir aux alouettes : destin sociologique des images du nu indigène

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I have no intention to open a new chapter in the old and often gratuitous campaign against Orientalism. In my first book, The Ideology of Contemporary Arabs, I criticized the works of certain Orientalists, but not because they were of western inspiration. It was rather because they were showing to my taste too much sympathy for Muslim tradition. I was harsh on Hamilton Gibb and Cantwell Smith because I felt they were unfair in their treatment of such modernists as Muhammad ’Abduh and Muhammad Iqbal. Compare their haughty attitude and that more cautious, more balanced, of the late Professor Albert Hourani, and you will understand my overreaction.

What I mean by Western Orientalism is precisely the attitude of Gibb and his followers. I was never able to comprehend it properly and that’s why I decided to discuss it candidly before you.

There is, however, a more obvious reason to define a Western Orientalism and set it apart. There is now a substantial amount of work being done by Easterners, in many parts of the geographical East, far or near, and also in countries of the western hemisphere. Sooner or later there will emerge fundamental differences between the two groups going far beyond religious, political or methodological oppositions. The main divide, in my view, will be between those who take for granted certain values and ideals which are not so evident to the others. Many Easterners will undoubtedly share Western values and therefore will be counted among Western Orientalists, while many Westerners will be doubtful about their own heritage and will certainly be excluded from the congregation. Orientalism is Western, not because it predominates in the countries of the West, even if on the whole this is true today, but because it shares common epistemological assumptions.

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Abdelkrim Khadim est à El Jadida. ·

The official in charge of the state, Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, issues a decree to demolish the house of Al-Abbas Ibn Abdul-Muttalib and replace it with a better house in another place. (official decision).
The reason is the expansion of the Sacred House of God.
(fact).
Listen to Al-Abbas’ response. He said: No, Omar, you will not demolish my house
(freedom of expression)
Omar said: Abbas, it is for the sake of the house of God.
(propitiation).
Al-Abbas said: I will not allow you, Omar
(The dignity of the citizen before the head of state).
Omar said: Let us resort to the judiciary
(justice).
Omar said: Choose a judge to judge between us, Abbas
(humility).
Al-Abbas said: The judge chose Shurayh
(Reputation and Integrity).
Omar said and I agree
(equality)..
Al-Abbas replied: Bring it to us, Commander of the Faithful.
Omar said: The judge does not go to anyone, but we are the ones who go to him
(independence of the judiciary)
So they went to the judge, and when the judge spoke, he said to Omar: O Commander of the Faithful!!
(respect for the admin)
Omar replied, saying: Do not call me the Commander of the Faithful, because we are in the court! (Humility and respect for the judiciary) Call me Omar
The judge said, O Omar: The furthest of the houses from the forbidden
It is the house of God..and you do not have the right to demolish the house of Al-Abbas and replace him in his place except with his consent
(Justice, heavy honesty, stripped of responsibility)
What was Omar’s response?? He said to him: Yes, the judge is you, Shreh.
(Acknowledgment of the truth even against yourself).
So Omar promoted the judge to a minister in the House of Justice
(Trust and loyalty) ..
Then Al-Abbas said to Omar: I gave up my house with my consent, Omar, for the sake of God.
(giving on your own accord)
And here is the question
Does the Islamic nation suffer from the absence of people like Abbas..??!!!
Or like Omar..??!!!
Or like a slice..??!!!
Transported.

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Islam: Hérédité Culturelle, Modernisation Politique et Libéralisme Économique

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

11/26/2017 Introduction Une grande donnée historique a émergé dés l’apparition de l’islam et qui a grandi lors des conflits de succession après Abou Bakr.  La période correspondante est le point culminant dans la politisation de l’islam et en son sein que se trouve les racines pour l’éclosion des divergences et les premières semences de discorde … Lire la Suite →

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Take a book published under the auspices of UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. It contains two contributions about Islam, one by a well-known Egyptian professor of philosophy, the other by a prolific political analyst from East Africa. Both are decidedly Western in outlook, compared to others originating in India and sub-Saharan Africa. Nationality, religion, mother tongue do not count as much as does the perspective chosen by the writer. The African contributor, a Muslim, presented his negative remarks about historic Islam in the light of a general assessment of monotheism, but what is puzzling is that even that criticism is made in the framework of monotheism, ancient or modern. Up to now we had heard only three interpretations of the same concept. Even the so-called “paradox of monotheism,” used by our essayist in a sense different from that meant by Henry Corbin, is a polemical invention of Christian and ultimately Gnostic origin. What would be truly innovative would be a criticism coming from really exotic quarters having no previous relation with the myth of Abraham. That would be still Orientalism but non-Western.

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Occident et Moyen-Orient: Religion Islam et Idéologie Arabe

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

La porte a été largement ouverte pour des embargos, de nouvelles escalades de la violence, des actions armées clandestines, des expéditions punitives, des attaques camouflées, des coups de boutoirs mercenaires, des attaques ouvertes et des contre-attaques ouvertes. 19 hommes ont détourné quatre avions commerciaux de passagers et en ont claqué deux dans les tours du…Lire la Suite →

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Orientalism is Western when it takes the West not as an event, but as an idea preordained in all eternity, complete and final from the beginning. And if it starts from this point, it has to construct its subject-matter as an explicitly, totally different item, reduced to the form it had at its birth. The two assumptions are clearly related; if the West is a fulfilled promise, the non-West has to be unfulfilled since unannounced. If the first is predetermined the second is necessarily accidental. In both cases no evolutionary process is ever conceived. Positive changes, when detected in the West, are predicated on preexistent seeds, and so are defects, flaws, wants in the non-West. One is a welcome miracle, which can change and remain the same, while the other, particularly Islam, is an unwelcome accident, not permitted to change without betraying itself.

It is clear that these assumptions are common to the Western Orientalist and the Muslim fundamentalist. The latter, ancient or modern, also refuses to take history seriously into account; he apprehends the West as a concept given once for all, and compares it in every respect with what he calls true or pure Islam.

The direct consequence of such an anachronism is that the arguments on both sides are usually opportunistic. Eclectic subjectivism is more apparent in Islamic writings about the West, but it can be detected easily in Orientalist works as well, even when they are not openly polemical.

Having, I hope, made myself clear about what I mean by Western Orientalism, I go on now to state the main theme of this talk. Whoever affirms categorically that such and such Western value-system, be it liberalism, rationalism, humanism, etc., is incompatible with Islam is talking theology and therefore, while he may well be right in his domain–I mean theology–he is in no way entitled to translate his idiom into sociology or political science. His assertion means no more than that the West, as he defines it, is never to be found in the non-West. I see the same tautology behind the so-called uniqueness of Islam, and during the last two decades my main concern was to unveil it to Muslim audiences. I continue then the same battle, in different circumstances, using the same language, the same logic.

The nation-state

In order to clarify my position, I will take the example of the State in contemporary Islam.

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Ottoman Islamic Empire, European Colonial Empires and Middle East Wars

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

…Lire la Suite →

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Empire Islamique Ottoman et l’Europe au Moyen-Orient: Interventions Militaires, Morcellement Politique et Usurpation Economique

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

JUNE 28, 2018

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Islam, we are told, came to destroy age-old world empires, unjust and corrupt, and replace them with a free, egalitarian, God-fearing community (Umma). Did it succeed in translating this lofty ambition into a durable reality? A positive historian would immediately and emphatically answer, No, while a theologian or a jurist would simply turn a blind eye to the events of history and concentrate on analyzing the terms of the Da’wa (mission). We have on one hand a succession of historic states (Duwwal) called Islamic and on the other a beautifully articulated theory of the Caliphate. Even in the hands of a Mawardi, reputed to be a realist, it aims mainly at saving the appearances.

At present, as in the past, many refer to the theory in order to deny existent facts. During the colonial era, illiterate administrators and learned scholars were agreed that the Muslim sees nothing between tribe and Umma and that he will never heed the call of a westernized minority to set up an imaginary nation-state. Today there is in many parts of the Islamic world a powerful movement working hard for the demise of the territorial institutions and their replacement by a universal Islamic state. It seems therefore that there is indeed a case for claiming that Islam cannot, in theory and in practice, coexist fully, harmoniously, with the laws of a modern nation-state.

And yet we have today more than 40 states which we call Islamic either because the majority of their citizens are Muslims or because they are officially members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and there is no way to understand how they work, efficiently or not. It is not for us to judge, if we start with the Islamic theory of state. We may stop here and ask: Who is foolish enough to take that line? Well, in the current discussion about secularism, democracy, human rights, women’s emancipation etc., is it not rare to find people who speak about present constitutions and laws, jurisprudence, decrees enacted by contemporary parliaments, opinion polls etc.? What is offered to us in most cases is the same old theory which, as I said, doesn’t even apply to the times of the first Caliphs. Muslim rulers, using the same tactics, keep saying: Islam allows this, forbids that, when 90 percent of their peoples disagree with them. This unhistoric, anti-empiricist bias is usually justified by the fact that the present State is the result of colonial rule and cannot therefore be called authentically Islamic. But this point is not always true; in many instances we detect an undeniable historical continuity. After all, the Shu’ubiyya movement is much older than the colonial expansion of Western Europe.

The nation-state of today, created or not by colonialism, accepted or not by the majority of the population, legitimate or not in the eyes of many local ideologues, is very likely here to stay. Any judgment as to its inherent illegitimacy and therefore its political weakness, would be pure prejudice. Such an attitude so common among Westerners seems all the more strange when we compare it to that of scholars working in other areas, the ex-communist countries for instance. During the Bolshevik era also we had a political theory that refused to accept the reality of the nation-state which was in that area too the result of imperialist manipulations, even if in some cases such as Bohemia or Romania we find a degree of historical continuity. The communist universal state, that sort of cooptative atheist caliphate, ruled over the region for decades–in this century not in days long past–with the powerful means of modern technology, not with the limited resources of medieval times. And yet, even at the height of its power, Western scholars never forgot that the nation-state was there, shaping beneath the surface the future of the region. When the seemingly indestructible party of the proletariat finally and unexpectedly collapsed, they discovered what they always had suspected being there.

Two different attitudes then: firm denial of the theory and easy acceptance of reality in one case, blind affirmation of the theory and constant refusal of facts in the other. These show another aspect of a fundamentalism I call Western even when it is practiced by Easterners.

The ordeal of Muhammad ‘Abduh

In a book I wrote 30 years ago I selected Muhammad ‘Abduh as the prototype of the Shaikh in opposition to Lutfy Sayyid the liberal politician and Salama Musa the eloquent advocate of scientism and technicism. I stressed at the same time that each one of the three ideal types necessarily undergoes many changes in proportion as the local State passes from colonial tutelage to independence and parliamentary institutions and at a later stage enters on the road of cultural nationalism and socialism. Under colonial rule the three are influenced more or less by the general climate of the age; they are all imbued with liberal values. What characterizes the Shaikh is his constant effort to find a traditional basis for his newly acquired ideals. It is this permanent ideological twist which seemed unacceptable to Gibb and his students.

I never tried to hide this aspect that led ‘Abduh to numerous inconsistencies, superficialities, and probably prevented him from contemplating a profound reform of Islam; but these defects, which could be ascribed to the circumstances, were in my view largely offset by obvious qualities: commitment, independence and inquisitiveness of mind, steadfastness, etc. He had a detailed knowledge of the philosophical and theological tradition of Islam, which is no longer the case with many Shaikhs of today, and if his grasp of Western scholarship was shaky, at least he knew that and tried courageously to acquire some of it directly and with an open mind, which is more than can be said of most present Islamist ideologues. This positive view of ‘Abduh prevailed in academic Arab circles when I wrote my first book.

Quite recently I returned to the same material and I was surprised to find a complete reversal of attitude. Naturally I knew beforehand that the solutions put forward by ‘Abduh a century ago were no longer adapted to present conditions, and that the assessment of the younger scholars would be more critical, but what I found was of a different nature. Moral condemnation and political recrimination have replaced rational criticism. Inconsistent, defeatist, insincere, opportunist, collaborationist, unfaithful, free-thinker etc.–these are the mildest among the terms used by his detractors. He is presented now as if he had been the unique obstacle to a true and lasting Islamic reform, as if he had played deliberately into the hands of his faith’s enemies.

I am not saying that this violent reaction was triggered by the negative assessment of Gibb, in the celebrated 1947 book, even if many of ’Abduh’s critics rely heavily on that study in particular, without giving, as usual, the reference. What I do say is that Gibb’s negative view on the Islamic reformists of the Liberal age, as well as his denial of any originality to Ibn Khaldun, heralded a new era in Western scholarship. All of a sudden in mid-century the interest shifted from philosophy to theology, from literature to law, from marginal schools to orthodox Islam. It was discovered that the “Mu’tazila” were after all not so liberal as they seemed at first, that Ghazzali was an authentic philosopher and not only a powerful dialectician, that Ash’ari was more consistent in his thinking than his “Mu’tazilite” mentor, that the literalist Creed of Ibn Hanbal or Ibn Hazm was the only acceptable interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna, and thus the worst enemies of philosophy were given the status of great philosophers or profound thinkers. The rationale behind the shift is apparently convincing: Why should we set so much store upon schools that disappeared long ago without leaving any discernible mark on present Islamic life?

However what should be emphasized here is that the same shift can be detected in Islamic circles as well. Is this pure coincidence? It wouldn’t be easy to answer the question. I don’t refer here to the seats of traditional learning, al-Azhar or al-Qarawiyiri, but to the newly-established universities where many professors were European or educated in Europe. Who argues that the Falasifa, at least the Idealists (“Ilahiyun”) among them can be saved from eternal damnation? ’Abduh the Shaikh. And who argues that they can never be redeemed? Sulaiman Dinia, the able editor of Avicenna and Averroes. If there is indeed coincidence in this case, it is of an objective nature, originating in a widening knowledge of what really happened in history.

After all, we know for a fact that Ghazzali won the day against his adversaries, that legalism (“Athar,” “Ta’sil”) defeated rational interpretation (“Ra’,” “Ta’wil”), that the sequence—”Hanafism,” “Malikism,” “Shafi’ism,” “Hanbalism”—in “Fiqh” history, betrays a growing ascendancy of the literalist and fideist schools. Historiography shows in every field a trend clearly opposed to what is usual in modern European history: the passing of time reinforces traditionalist thinking instead of weakening it, and this constantly revived tradition is ascribed to the very beginning, which makes time look immobile or circular. That kind of involution has to be discovered sooner or later. The Western scholars who at first were not aware of this particularity exaggerated the importance of currents of thought that sounded familiar to them, in which they recognized an episode of their own history, but gradually, forced to reconcile themselves with this specific reality, they tried to make sense of it.

From this sketch it would be easy to conclude that we have identified three independent movements. One is purely Islamic and took place in the distant past, another also Islamic but more recent, the third equally recent but concerning Western scholarship. All three point towards the defeat of liberal rational tendencies at the hands of the literalist tradition dominant today. Such an agreement is habitually seen as the criterion of objective truth. If that had been the case the occasion should have been ideal for a general reconciliation. Muslim scholars should have congratulated their colleagues in the West, and all the congregation should have continued ever since to work in harmony in defense of a pure unchanging Islam.

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How the West gets Muslims wrong in video games

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

DEAN TAKAHASHI@DEANTAK MARCH 28, 2016 8:30 AM Muslim blood is cheap. It’s easy to depict Muslims as the villains in video games these days. How we show Muslims in video games is slanted in a way that reflects the storytelling biases of Westerners who don’t follow Islam. And the voices and perspectives of a minority group … Lire la Suite →

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Why did we get a quite different picture?

The other perspective

In history events are never unequivocal. The movements just mentioned are not as independent as they appear. Here we are not comparing religions as far apart in time and space as, say, Confucianism and Judaism, but Islam and Christianity always in contact, always in conflict. We cannot affirm simply: the Christian West evolved from tradition to liberalism, while Islam, by a kind of compensatory movement, took the opposite direction, because neither of these two assertions would be totally true.

Let’s for a brief moment imagine something quite possible, even if it is improbable at present, in the Arab lands at least: the creation of an institute for the study of the Western religious history. Let’s suppose moreover that the scholars who work in it are profoundly influenced by the metaphysical romanticism of Germany, by the vigorous neocatholicism of last century France and England. Would it not be natural for them to conclude that the Lutheran reformation has failed, that the system of the counter-reformation is intellectually more consistent, more gratifying to the human heart? Moreover, seeing the pervasive influence of the Russian Orthodox thought among Western intellectuals during the second half of the 19th century, would not these scholars be tempted to go even further and state that the usually indulgent and compromising Roman Church has betrayed the true Christian message? Something of this has in effect been explicitly asserted by Henry Corbin, who worked in an institute that was active in prerevolutionary Iran. Such a reconstruction of Western religious history is not purely imaginary; it could be documented in many ways, supported as it is by great names in philosophy and literature. It would be acceptable to serious scholars in the West. The vast majority, however, would reject it. They would say, well, liberalism may seem inconsistent, may have been defeated in the judgment of many professors of philosophy, but it is still alive and well; it has been during the last two centuries and still is the dominant factor in the economic, social and political fields.

But what does such an argument imply if not that there is no absolute correlation between logical inconsistencies, intellectual bankruptcy and historical prevalence and perdurability? Liberalism expressed in religious terms as deism, secularism, individualism, moralism, may well be shallow and weak, and it may lose every battle in the classroom—in the “Madrasa” I should say—and still triumph outside, in the marketplace.

If such an argument is acceptable in a Western context, it should be received as well when Islam is concerned. No amount of evidence culled from works ancient or modern could ever justify the assertion that liberal Islam is improbable solely because it embodies a logical contradiction. Neohanbalism, so popular today among certain intellectuals, may be consistent in theory and yet prove inappropriate to our time, while Neomu’tazilism, logically contradictory in the eyes of many, may well be in conformity with our present situation.

If liberal Islam is nowadays silent or inarticulate, while it is probably the choice of the majority among the educated—those who can understand its idiom but, it should be conceded, count for less than half the population—it is not because experience has shown that it is incompatible with the Five pillars of the faith or that it disfigures the Prophet’s message of divine absolute transcendancy. In my opinion it is simply because until now it has never been able to rely on the joint support of wealth, positive science and technology, the three revolutionary forces that go along with any long-term economic development.

Nobody cares about a possible awakening of Shintoism, Buddhism or Confucianism in Asia because everybody can see for himself that the peoples of the region have other concerns. “God has never put two hearts within one man’s body,” says the Koran (XXXIII, 4). On this premise was based the benevolent policy of the West towards its past enemies there, policy which until now seems to have worked perfectly. Why not enlarge it to other areas?

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Samir Amin: Eurocentrisme, au-delà de la Décolonisation

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Si vous voulez vraiment la décolonisation, allez au-delà de la critique culturelle vers les profondes idées structurelles de l’économiste Samir Amin Texte Original publié en Anglais: Beyond Eurocentrism, If you really want decolonisation, go beyond cultural criticism to the deep structural insights of economist Samir Amin Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven est chargé de cours (professeur adjoint) en … Lire la Suite →

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Islam: Naissance, Schisme, Renaissance et Occidentalisation

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

11/26/2017 Introduction Une grande donnée historique a émergé dés l’apparition de l’islam et qui a grandi lors des conflits de succession après Abou Bakr.  La période correspondante est le point culminant dans la politisation de l’islam et en son sein que se trouve les racines pour l’éclosion des divergences et les premières semences de discorde … Lire la suite « Islam: Naissance,

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Liberal Islam

What I am trying to say is simply this: Such statements as, “Islam and democracy are incompatible,” or, “Islam is intrinsically, while any other religions are only occasionally, fundamentalist,” mean nothing more than “Liberalism contradicts Dogmatism,” which is true and trivial. Trivial since it is always true and since it says nothing about the future. A pure idea, potent as it might have been in the past, influential as it may still be at present, cannot by itself prevent a people from adopting liberalism and democracy. Only a material force can stop other forces working in a giving society.

In my view liberal Islam means more than tolerant or moderate Islam; that is the reason why I cannot say in good faith that it exists already, or is imminent, somewhere in the Islamic world. People focus their attention on particulars like marriage, human rights, secularism etc. and seem to think that these are the content of what a liberal Islam should be. Here lies in my opinion a confusion between religious reform and political revolution. Even when dogma and law are closely linked, there are ways to introduce under the veil of temporary necessity (“Darura”) or expediency (“Maslaha,” “Istihsan”) topical reforms without tampering with the dogma (“Aqida”).

By liberal Islam I mean something quite different, which does not require me to detail the reforms I should like to see taking place in Islamic societies.

I define as liberal a situation in which society is set free to operate according to its own rules; I don’t say its specific rules because this is a trick familiar to traditionalists. I think that in circumstances of rapid change we need only to open our eyes to be convinced that society doesn’t obey our orders, even when we believe that these come ultimately from God. Miracles just do not occur. To acknowledge the fact amounts to a mental revolution, what I call “Qati’a” (rupture, divorce), which opens all doors. Everything becomes possible. I don’t understand otherwise what occurred lately in Russia and before that in Spain. What economists and statisticians call transition in these countries seems to me the mere translation of the following statement: Ideology is, in the long term, less powerful than sociology. As soon as this fact is recognized the reforms just mentioned become inevitable because they serve the interests of all, including those who oppose them for ideological motives. From this standpoint I don’t see in Islamic countries so much the preeminence of a “Da’wa” (religious message) or the ascendancy of a clerical elite, as the direct consequence of poverty and economic backwardness.

Here many would take exception. Aren’t the nations with powerful Islamist movements precisely those that have gone through an excessively rapid development? My feeling is that the economic development of those countries, strong and rapid as it certainly was, didn’t last long enough to make change general and irreversible. Moreover, it was, inadvertently perhaps, weakened by a discordant cultural policy. Political Islam was encouraged there long before the local leaders became aware of their error and fell out with its advocates.

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Middle East – Mosaic of Foreign Interests with Local Collaboration

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

AFRICA ★ MOROCCO AMERICAS ★ USA   AMERICA LATINA   ASIA ★ CHINA   EUROPA ★ FRANCE   MIDDLE EAST   AFRIQUE ★  MAROC AMÉRIQUES ★ EUA AMÉRIQUE LATINE ASIE ★ CHINE EUROPE ★ FRANCE MOYEN ORIENT Moyen Orient: Un Marché d’Armes – Un Bazar Bizarre d’Antagonismes   Front Page Press Review_ Revue de Press Au Moyen Orient,…Lire la Suite →

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Occident et Moyen Orient Arabe: Croisade Morale ou Intérêt National

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Nation Arabe et Notion du Pouvoir au Moyen Orient Les pays « Arabes » sont victimes d’une histoire de la conquête du pouvoir qui est basée sur la notion de la tribu et de la fierté de la tribu et non de la nation comme dans l’occident ou la nation est en premier mise en avant et … Lire la Suite →

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However, the West doesn’t pursue the same policy as regards the economic development of non-Western nations. It is seen as a necessary step towards liberalization and therefore is actively sought in China, Eastern Europe etc., whereas it is felt as a threat when Islamic countries are concerned, even before the ambitions are translated into reality.

The collapse of the Berlin wall was not due to the policy of containment, blockade, propaganda as much as to a wise policy of easy term loans, free trade and enhanced cultural exchanges. The same strategy should secure the same results elsewhere. Sooner or later a developing society frees itself from ideas and ideals that do no longer correspond to its new aspirations.

For reasons I need not detail here such an evolution will probably occur more easily in the “Ajam” countries of Asia than in the Arab Middle East and North Africa, not because the former are less religious but simply because the latter are on the whole less fortunate. Seeing that happening some time in the future, somewhere in the vast Islamic world, seeing that the law of society has at last prevailed over the orders of tradition or the commands of ideology, many will, I am sure, cry out, as they do now, facing the staggering performances of some Asian nations: Well, the seeds were always there; we failed to see them before, but now we take notice and we cheer.

Reprinted from the Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol 31, No. 1, July 1997,. Copyright 1997 by the Middle East Studies Association of North America

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Genèse du Pouvoir dans le Monde Musulman

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Version Initiale Publiée a EL JADIDA  MAZAGAN ⵎⴰⵣⴰⵖⴰⵏ  MAZAGÃO DOUKKALA  MOROCCO et dans El Jadida Scoop English Version: Islam and Politics in Muslim World Cette analyse est une présentation d’une recherche en cours et ne constitue qu’une première partie d’un sujet dont les vicissitudes et les conséquences sont encore de nos jours une actualité quotidienne et … Lire la Suite →

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Active Said El Mansour Cherkaoui Author Admin +1

Lieu et Date de Naissance : Azemmour , le 7/11/1933 Biographie :Abdallah Laroui (عبد الله العروي) est un historien, romancier et philosophe marocain. Agrégé de langue et civilisation arabe, il a enseigné à l’université Mohammed V de Rabat jusqu’en 2000. Auteur d’une “Histoire du Maghreb”, Laroui se fait connaitre avec son livre “L’Idéologie arabe contemporaine” ; ouvrage dans lequel l’auteur analyse les ressorts sur lesquels la conscience arabe contemporaine se fonde pour tenter une opposition face à son éternel autre, l’Occident. L’analyse de Laroui fait date et consacre l’historien en tant que critique de la conscience arabe contemporaine.Il est aussi l’auteur de plusieurs essais “La Crise des intellectuels arabes : traditionalisme ou historicisme ?” (1978), “Islam et Histoire : essai d’épistémologie” (1999), “Tradition et Réforme” (2009)), de romans (“L’Exil” (1998)) et de témoignages qui l’ont rendu célèbre dans le monde arabe, en Europe et aux États-Unis.2 6y

Aicha Ben Lhaiba Et quel historien! Un chercheur et penseur d’une très grande qualité que je respecte beaucoup, voire que j’adore ! !!!! 6y

Seg Med Mohamed Également bcp de respect et de considération à l’égard de ce grand personnage. Un homme du terroir et c’est du gros calibre.

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Immigration, Islamisme et Nationalisme d’Europe

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui Publié initialement le 4 Décembre, 2015 dans le site Linkedin: Immigration et Europe Les Grandes Lignes de la Politique Européenne sur l’Immigration La politique européenne de l’asile et de l’immigration repose tout d’abord sur le principe de liberté de circulation des personnes au sein des 26 pays membres de l’espace Schengen….Lire la Suite →

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Islamisme et Immigration en France

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Nos Condoléances aux Familles des Victimes et au Peuple de France J’ai passé 17 ans en France (Montpellier, Grenoble et Paris). Mon Prof. fut Pierre Rondot a SciencesPo de Grenoble et mes premières recherches sur l’Islam, le Moyen Orient et ses imbrications en Occident furent l’objet par la suite de mes publications et mes présentations … Lire la Suite →

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Modernisme Occidental et Islam Traditionnel

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

Les Raisons de la Colère contre l’Islam en Terre des Nationalistes d’Europe L’Europe dans toute son histoire a été souvent le théâtre de la violence culturelle et religieuse. L’Europe n’a pas vu un seul siècle sans guerre ou conflit ou antagonisme social et autre. Donc, l’Europe même la raison de la construction de son actuelle … Lire la Suite →

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The West, the Arabs and Islam in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001

Said El Mansour Cherkaoui

19 men hijacked four commercial passenger planes and slammed two of them into the World Trade Center towers and one into the Pentagon. The fourth, which was believed to be aimed for the Capitol, crashed into a Pennsylvania field instead. Western Intervention in the Middle East: Moral Crusade or National Interest? The West Inside the … Lire la Suite →

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Abdelkrim Khadim is in El Jadida.

State Official Omar bin Al-Khattab issues a decree to demolish the house of Abbas bin Abdul-Mutaleb and replace it with a better house elsewhere. (Official Decision)

And the reason is the expansion of the Holy House..

( A matter of fact )

Listen to the response of Abbas, he said: No Omar, you will not destroy my house

(Freedom of speech)

Omar said: O Abbas, it is for the sake of the House of Allah ..

( flexing )

Al-Abbas said: I will not allow you Omar

(Dignity of a citizen in front of the President).

Omar said: Let’s resort to the judiciary

( JUSTICE ) .

Omar said: Choose a judge to judge between us, Abbas

(Humbleness).

Al-Abbas said: The judge chose Sharih

(Reputation and integrity )

Omar said and I agree

(Equality)..

Fard Al-Abbas: Bring it to us, O prince of the believers.

Omar said: The judge doesn’t go to anyone, but we go to him

(Independence of the Judiciary)

So they went to the judge, and when the judge spoke, he said to Omar: O Commander of the Faithful!!

(Respect to the admin)

Omar’s response saying: Don’t call me the prince of the believers because we are in the House of Judiciary! (Humility and respect the judiciary) Call me Omar

Judge Omar said: Keep the houses away from the forbidden

He is the house of god.. And you do not have the right to destroy the house of Abbas and replace it with his consent

(Justice, heavy trust, stripped of responsibility)

So what was Omar’s response?? He said to him, yes, you are the judge, you judge..

(Acknowledge the right even to yourself)

Omar promoted the judge to a minister in the judiciary

( Trust and loyalty )..

Then Abbas said to Omar: I have renounced my house with my consent, Omar, for the sake of Allah.

(Giving from a Kind Heart)

And here is the question

Does the Islamic nation suffer from the absence of people like Abbas..??!!!

A mother like Omar.. ???!!!

Mom like a slice.. ???!!!

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